The Trial Judge’s Satisfaction As to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1966 Issue 3 
January 1966 
The Trial Judge’s Satisfaction As to the Factual Basis of Guilty 
Pleas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
The Trial Judge’s Satisfaction As to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 WASH. U. L. Q. 306 (1966). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss3/2 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S SATISFACTION AS TO
THE FACTUAL BASIS OF GUILTY PLEAS
An estimated ninety per cent of criminal convictions in state and federal
courts are based on guilty pleas.' This single fact demonstrates the dom-
inant role of the guilty plea process in the administration of criminal justice
and emphasizes the importance of insuring the accuracy of such pleas.
Defendants who plead not guilty and stand trial are protected by a multi-
tude of safeguards designed to avoid conviction of the innocent.2 Modem
procedures for accepting guilty pleas should also be designed to prevent
the conviction of innocent defendants; however, the guilty plea process is
characterized by less elaborate procedures which often ignore the issue of
guilt or innocence.'
An innocent person may plead guilty for a variety of reasons. He may be
unaware of his innocence because of an erroneous belief that his conduct
constitutes the crime charged,4 or an erroneous belief that he committed
certain acts.5 On the other hand, a defendant who is confident of his inno-
cence may plead guilty because of mental disability, or because he fears
he will be unable to establish his innocence. When informed of many courts
practice of giving lighter sentences to defendants who save the state the
expense of a trial,6 an innocent person may be unable to resist a prosecutor's
offer of a reduced charge in exchange for a guilty plea."
One method of preventing false pleas is judicial inquiry into the facts
supporting the charge. Professor Newman, in his definitive study of adjudi-
cation by plea of guilty, has observed that some trial judges do make a
factual inquiry before finally accepting guilty pleas, 8 although those who
do so appear to be in the minority.' Some procedures aimed primarily at
1. NE WMA'r, ConvicTnoN 1 (1966).
2. Id. at 10.
3. Ibid.
4. 34 F.R.D. 411, 418 (1964).
5. See State ex rel. Crossley v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 116 N.W.2d 666 (1962).
6. E.g., United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960); Euziere v. United
States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957); Note, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 220-21 (1956). See
generally 26 F.R.D. 231, 285-89 (1959).
7. Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir.) (dissenting opinion), rev'd
on rehearing, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 356 U.S. 26 (1958); see NEWMAN,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 237.
8. NEWMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 20-21.
9. It appears that only a handful of state courts are making any type of formal investi-
gation or findings as to the factual basis of guilty pleas. Notes 33-61 infra and accom-
panying text.
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accomplishing other goals indirectly result in such examinations; for ex-
ample, a presentence investigation may turn up facts which cast doubt on
the defendant's guilt. However, with few exceptions, judges at most need
inquire only into the voluntariness of guilty pleas and assure themselves
that the pleas were made with understanding of the possible consequences."
This note is a review of state and federal procedures used to determine the
facts in cases in which guilty pleas are entered.
I. GUILTY PLEAS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The federal courts are considered separately because recent changes in
their rules for accepting guilty pleas will probably influence procedures
in many states. Currently, federal courts are governed by Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which directs district courts to deter-
mine that all guilty pleas are entered "voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge."'" A new Rule 11, which goes into effect July 1,
1966, requires federal judges to satisfy themselves that the facts support the
plea." To put the new rule in proper perspective, the current practices in
federal courts are examined first.
A. Current Rule 11
1. No Requirement That District Courts Look Into the Actual Basis
of Guilty Plea
The current rule is a codification of Fogus v. United States." Though
language in that opinion could have been read as compelling an inquiry
into "facts on which it [the plea] is founded,"' 4 the case was not given that
interpretation. With but one short-lived exception,' 5 the courts have held
10. E.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 254 Ky. 775, 72 S.W.2d 472 (1934); State v.
Banford, 13 Utah 2d 63, 368 P.2d 473 (1962); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-6 (1953); Aiaz. R. CRsm. P. 183.
11. Fa. R. Cmn. P. 11.
12. 34 F.R.D. 411, 417 (1964).
13. 34 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1929).
14. Id. at 98.
15. La Fever v. United States, 257 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1958), was a short-lived ex-
ception to the position that courts, in accepting guilty pleas, need not look into the
question of the accused's guilt or innocence. The case held that since the defendant had
not in fact committed the crime charged, the district court lacked jurisdiction to accept
his guilty plea. The court labeled the circumstances of the crime "jurisdictional facts,"
and it is clear that the court was investigating the issue of guilt or innocence. For a dis-
cussion of the confusion surrounding the use of the term "jurisdictional facts" in La
Fever see 62 W. VA. L. Rav. 268 (1960). The case was quickly overruled by United
States v. Hoyland, 264 F.2d 346 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959).
The court in Hoyland held that since the guilty plea admits all essential allegations, a
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that Rule 11 does not require an inquiry into the factual basis of a guilty
plea. 6 Because the trial judge is under no obligation to interrogate the
defendant as to either the voluntariness of the plea or his understanding of
the charge,"7 it is not likely that an accused will have any opportunity to
present his version of the case. Thus, procedures under the present Rule
are not likely to expose the events of alleged offenses.
2. The Extent to Which Federal Courts Examine the Factual Basis
of Guilty Pleas of Their Own Volition
It is difficult to determine from the case reports the extent to which
federal courts voluntarily conduct inquiries into the factual basis of guilty
pleas. 8 Numerous federal opinions, which discuss procedures for accepting
judgment may be entered without conducting an independent inquiry or hearing to deter-
mine "jurisdictional facts."
In Julian v. United States, 236 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1956), the defendant's attorney
made admissions in court which were tantamount to a plea of guilty. In reversing the
conviction, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial judge should
have investigated the accused's felonious intent. Inquiry as to the defendant's intent goes
a long way toward determining the factual basis of his plea. However, it was probably
because of the peculiar manner in which the plea was entered-the defendant's attorney
in stipulations made admissions of fact which constituted a guilty plea-that the court
found an obligation to examine the intent of the defendant. It is unlikely that the court
would have required this had the trial court complied with Rule 11.
Two judges, in a dissenting opinion in United States v. Shelton, 246 F.2d 571, 577
(5th Cir. 1957), rev'd per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958), criticized the failure of federal
courts to look into the factual basis of guilty pleas. They pointed out that the "primary
matter to be determined is the guilt or innocence of the accused," and deplored the
court's inquiring instead into whether or not a good bargain had been made between
the defendant and the prosecutor. Id. at 580.
16. E.g., Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963); Adkins v. United
States, 298 F.2d 842 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 954 (1962); Heideman v. United
States, 281 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1962).
17. Johnson v. United States, 301 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1962); Barber v. United States,
227 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1955); Taylor v. United States, 182 F.2d 473 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 988 (1950). The rule establishes no procedure for accepting guilty
pleas. E.g., Turner v. United States, 325 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
946 (1964); Kennedy v. United States, 249 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1957), judgment on
remand aff'd, 259 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 994 (1959).
18. Eleven appellate opinions indicate that the lower court determined that the ac-
cused in fact committed the offense charged. Since district courts which follow this pro-
cedure will probably have few of their guilty plea verdicts challenged by appeals, there
may be many other district courts which conduct such inquiries. However, over thirty
cases were found which apparently indicate that no examination into the facts occurred.
A survey or poll of district courts would probably render accurate statistics as to the
use of factual inquiries. However, this type of survey is obviously impractical since no
trial judge is likely to admit that he sentences defendants without satisfying himself of
their guilt.
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guilty pleas, are devoid of any indication of an investigation into the facts
of the alleged offense.19 However, one author believes that such inquiries
are standard procedure in "many federal courts."2 The present study has
uncovered few cases which clearly indicate that factual examination took
place.
21
The manner of inquiry in these cases varies widely. For example, in a
district court in Louisiana, the attorney for the government calls his wit-
nesses,2 2 who then testify. The defendant is given a chance to ask them
questions and to contradict their stories. A similar procedure is followed
by a Florida district court,23 except there is apparently no interrogation of
witnesses by the defendant. Other federal courts simply allow defendants to
explain the facts of their offenses in detail before their guilty pleas are ac-
cepted. Sentence hearings are also utilized to ascertain the factual basis
of pleas.25
3. Appellate Review of Guilty Pleas
On appeals from guilty pleas, federal courts will not consider the question
of guilt or innocence since the plea itself is considered decisive of this issue.2"
19. E.g., Turner v. United States, 325 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
946 (1964); Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963); Bone v. United
States, 305 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1962), rev'd and remanded per curiam, 374 U.S. 503
(1963), afl'd on rehearing, 351 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1965); Domenica v. United States,
292 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1961); Reed v. United States, 291 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961);
Kennedy v. United States, 249 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1957), judgment on remand aff'd,
259 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 994 (1959); United States v.
Swaggerty, 218 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 959 (1955); Unites States
v. Denniston, 89 F.2d 696 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 709 (1937).
20. Hoffman, What Next in Federal Criminal Rules?, 21 WAsH. & Lrn L. RMv. 1, 11
(1964).
21. E.g., Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 916 (1965); Steffler v. United States, 143 F.2d 772 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 746 (1944); United States v. Cuff, 211 F. Supp. 680 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 311 F.2d
185 (5th Cir. 1962).
22. United States v. Cuff, supra note 21.
23. Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
916 (1965).
24. Pelletier v. United States, 350 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Everett v. United
States, 336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Steffler v. United States, 143 F.2d 772 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 746 (1944).
25. United States v. Semel, 347 F.2d 228 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840
(1965); Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 381 U.S. 953
(1964); Gawantka v. United States, 327 F.2d 129 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
969 (1964); United States v. Finney, 242 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
26. E.g., Adam v. United States, 274 F.2d 880 (10th Cir. 1960); Richardson v.
United States, 217 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1954); Bloombaum v. United States, 211 F.2d
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss3/2
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
This position has drawn sharp criticism from some members of the judi-
ciary,2" and a short-lived exception to the rule succeeded in circumventing
it temporarily.28 This refusal by the appellate courts to examine the facts
behind guilty pleas accentuates the importance of providing safeguards at
the district court level.
B. New Rule 11
New Rule 11 provides that a federal district judge must satisfy himself as
to the factual basis of guilty pleas before entering judgments." While the
new rule directs the judge to address "the defendant personally" in deter-
mining whether the plea was made voluntarily and with understanding of
the charge, no such procedural guideline is set out for the factual inquiry.
However, the Advisory Committee's comments to the new rule recommend
that the trial judge interrogate either the defendant or the attorney for the
government, or examine presentence reports to satisfy himself that the
accused in fact committed the crime charged. 30 This lack of specific pro-
cedural standards could cause wide diversity in the nature and scope of
inquiry conducted by the various courts. For instance, an Illinois district
court recently complied with the new rule voluntarily. The court inter-
preted the rule as calling for an inquiry, in appropriate cases, into whether
the defendant had discussed such technical issues as the statute of limita-
tions with his attorney. 1 Other courts may not agree that the new rule
requires an exploration of possible technical defenses.
II. INVESTIGATION OF THE FACTUAL BASIS OF GUILTY PLEAS
IN STATE COURTS
In the discussion of state procedures, a distinction is drawn between
direct and indirect investigations or inquiries. Direct investigations are those
conducted solely to determine the existence or absence of a factual basis
for the plea. Indirect inquiries are conducted primarily for some other
purpose, such as fixing punishment, but involve an exposure of facts which
may confirm or discredit a guilty plea.
944 (4th Cir. 1954); Friedman v. United States, 200 F.2d 690 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 926 (1952).
27. Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion),
rev'd per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
28. La Fever v. United States, 257 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1958). See the discussion of
the La Fever case in note 15 supra.
29. 34 F.R.D. 411, 417 (1964). Under new Rule 11, federal appellate courts must
obviously now consider the issue of guilt or innocence.
30. Id. at 418.
31. Cerniglia v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. IIl. 1964).
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A. Direct Investigations
A survey of the cases in which convictions based on guilty pleas have
been appealed indicates that only a handful of state courts are making any
type of direct investigation of their factual basis. The bases for these inves-
tigations are found in state constitutional provisions, statutes, court rules,
and judicial decisions. Moreover, some judges act on their own volition.
Though the vast majority of state courts conduct no factual inquiry, only
a few have specifically ruled that one is not mandatory when an accused
pleads guilty."
1. Formal Trial of Case After Entry of Guilty Plea
The greatest protection to defendants pleading guilty is offered by
Virginia, where a formal trial is conducted. This trial is required by a
constitutional provision3 which is self-executing". and cannot be waived by
the accused. 5 The form of the trial is dictated by a statute which directs the
trial judge to hear the case without a jury. 4 Apparently, therefore, the
entry of a guilty plea merely has the effect of waiving a jury trial, since the
prosecutor presumably must prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Failure to conduct such a trial is reversible error even if
asserted for the first time on appeal.37 In McGrady v. Cunningham,8 the
defendant sought a federal writ of habeas corpus on the ground that a
Virginia court had failed to inquire as to his understanding of the charge.
Noting that the trial had resulted in exposure of all the facts of the crime,
the federal court refused the petition. Obviously, such a trial obviates any
danger that an accused is pleading guilty when there is insufficient evidence
to convict.
While the Virginia procedure provides the most thorough investigation
of the factual basis, it is costly and time-consuming. Since the real value of
the guilty plea is in avoiding unnecessary litigation, the Virginia solution's
drawbacks may be as significant as its advantages.
32. People v. Kontopoulos, 26 Il1. 2d 388, 186 N.E.2d 312 (1962); Cox v. State,
398 P.2d 538 (Nev. 1965), held that the defendant could not explain his version of the
circumstances of the crime to the jury after entering a guilty plea.
33. VA. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
34. Thornhill v. Smyth, 185 Va. 986, 41 S.E.2d 11 (1947).
35. Dixon v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1098, 172 S.E. 277 (1934).
36. VA. Cova ANN. § 19.1-19.2 (1950) provides that: "Upon a plea of guilty...,
the court shall hear and determine the case without intervention of a jury."
37. Dixon v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1098, 172 S.E. 277 (1934).
38. 296 F.2d 600 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 855 (1962).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss3/2
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2. Evidence Presented To Establish Defendant's Guilt
While requiring less than a full trial on the issue of guilt or innocence,
several states do require the prosecutor to support his charge with the testi-
mony of witnesses or other evidence before judgment is entered.
A Texas statute provides that the prosecutor must present sufficient
evidence to support the charge when defendants waive a jury trial and
plead guilty in non-capital cases." The evidence must establish all elements
of the offense. Reversals have resulted from failures to prove intent in a
conviction for assault with intent to kill,40 to prove the corpus delicti in a
burglary case,4 to show the requisite value for grand larceny,4" and to prove
possession in a narcotics conviction."
The type and amount of evidence that will be considered adequate to
support a guilty plea are closely regulated by the Texas appellate courts.
The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice has been held inadequate,"'
as has a prosecutor's report that a capsule found in the accused's possession
contained heroin.4" In the latter case, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held that since the chemist who tested the capsule did not testify, such evi-
dence was hearsay.4" An extrajudicial confession alone has been held in-
sufficient;47 however, the uncorroborated testimony of the accused in court
has been accepted.48 These two cases are not inconsistent; judicially
supervised admissions are more free of potentially coercive influences than
are confessions out of court. Moreover, the judge can personally question
the defendant to clear up any discrepancies in his testimony. Texas courts
have accepted extrajudicial confessions when bolstered by affidavits of wit-
nesses,49 but these affidavits can be introduced only when approved by the
defendant." Excerpts from the report of a previous case in which an
39. TEx. CODE CRip. PRoc. art. 1.15 (1966).
40. Burks v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 15, 165 S.W.2d 460 (1942).
41. Franklin v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 215, 144 S.W.2d 581 (1940).
42. Price v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 326, 308 S.W.2d 47 (1957).
43. Martinez v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 266, 340 S.W.2d 56 (1960).
44. Hancock v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 568, 150 S.W.2d 385 (1941).
45. Braggs v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 405, 334 S.W.2d 793 (1960).
46. Ibid.
47. Franklin v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 251, 144 S.W.2d 581 (1940).
48. Alvarez v. State, 374 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
49. King v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 435, 341 S.W.2d 654 (1961); Ex parte Bruinsma,
164 Tex. Crim. 358, 298 S.W.2d 838, cert. denied, 354 U.S. 927 (1956).
50. Griffith v. State, 391 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Txx. CODE CRI.
PRoc. art. 1.15 (1966); see Ex parte Keener, 166 Tex. Crim. 326, 314 S.W.2d 93
(1958). Without his client's permission, defense counsel cannot agree to a stipulation
as to what the defendant would testify. Crawford v. State, 161 Tex. Grim. 554, 278
S.W.2d 845 (1955).
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accused was convicted of rape have also been held sufficient to support a
later plea of guilty to a lesser offense."'
Curiously, Texas law demands a greater inquiry into the factual basis
of guilty pleas in non-capital than in capital cases; in the latter, evidence
is introduced only on the issue of assessing punishment."
A similar Alabama statute provides that when there has been no grand
jury indictment or preliminary hearing, witnesses may be called to convince
the court of the defendant's guilt.5" This statute, therefore, is restricted to
a relatively small area. Apparently, the Alabama legislature concluded that
a sufficient factual inquiry occurs during grand jury investigations and pre-
liminary hearings.
Though there is no requirement that trial judges make factual inquiries
before accepting guilty pleas in Wisconsin, an instruction to trial judges
recommends that "the court take evidence of defendant's guilt.""4  Pro-
fesor Newman has reported that a post-guilty plea hearing is being used in-
creasingly by Wisconsin trial judges to insure the accuracy of convictions."5
These hearings are similar to the Texas procedure in non-capital cases
except that the defendant may call witnesses of his own. The state must
present a prima facie case of guilt. When the evidence is inconsistent with
the plea or raises doubts of the defendant's guilt, the judge entertains a
motion for withdrawal of the plea and orders a trial or a new arraignment
on a "more accurate charge."56 The Wisconsin hearing not only protects
the defendant, but also provides a full record which can protect the trial
judge, the prosecutor, the police, and defense counsel from later charges of
misconduct."
Though Maryland case law indicates clearly that trial judges are under
no duty to examine evidence when defendants plead guilty,58 defendants
51. Isaacs v. State, 391 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Grim. App. 1965).
52. However, hearings to assess punishment do offer some protection against false
pleas in capital cases in Texas. Harris v. State, 76 Tex. Grim. 126, 172 S.W. 975
(1915); Fite v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 279, 290 S.W.2d 897 (1956) (dictum).
53. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 264 (1958):
Upon the date fixed for the formal plea of guilty by the defendant, the court
shall proceed to hear the testimony of any witnesses who may be summoned or
offered either by the state or by the defendant, or whom the court may direct to
be summoned, and must hear also the testimony of the defendant; and, if, after
hearing such testimony, the court believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant is guilty . . . the court shall thereupon receive and enter the plea ....
(Emphasis added.)
54. NEWMAN, CONVICTION 12 (1966).
55. Id. at 19-21.
56. Id. at 20.
57. Ibid.
58. Hanks v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 232 Md. 661, 194 A.2d 445 (1963);
Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1, 73 Ad. 637 (1909).
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have been allowed to relate their versions of crimes9 and witnesses have been
called."' It is the practice of one West Virginia judge to refuse all guilty
pleas and hold trial until a certain amount of evidence has been brought
out.
61
3. Informal Inquiry Made by Judge at Time of Accepting Plea
In Michigan, investigations into the facts of cases are actually courtroom
discussions between defendants, prosecutors, and judges. 2 There are no
cases which indicate that witnesses are called or other evidence introduced
upon pleas of guilty. While the practice of conducting these discussions is
apparently widespread in the state, 3 it is doubtful that they are mandatory.
A statute", originally passed in 1875" provides that "whenever said judge
shall have reason to doubt the truth of such plea of guilty, it shall be his duty
to vacate the same, direct a plea of not guilty to be entered and order a trial
of the issue thus formed." This statute lacks an express command to investi-
gate the facts of alleged offenses. A court rule, drafted some 70 years later,
requires interrogation of defendants concerning the voluntariness of their
pleas and their understanding of the charge." There is no mention of in-
terrogation to establish guilt, and the omission appears to be significant.
Case law on the necessity of a factual inquiry also leaves the issue in doubt.
Forceful language in an early case0 and dicta in a 1959 decision 8 seem
unequivocally to require an investigation. However, the state supreme court,
in 1953, rejected an attempt to overturn a conviction on the ground of
failure to make such an inquiry," and there have been apparently no re-
59. Brown v. State, 227 Md. 389, 390-391, 177 A.2d 257 (1962); Brown v. State,
223 Md. 401, 402, 164 A.2d 722, 723 (1960).
60. Brown v. State, 223 Md. 401, 402, 164 A.2d 722, 723 (1960).
61. Beckett v. Boles, 218 F. Supp. 692 (N.D. W. Va. 1963).
62. E.g., People v. Barrows, 358 Ivich. 267, 99 N.W.2d 347 (1959); People v.
Banning, 329 Mich. 1, 44 N.W.2d 841 (1950); People v. Strick, 292 Mich. 173, 290
N.W. 369 (1940); People v. Hunn, 1 Mich. App. 580, 137 N.W.2d 275 (1965); see
People v. Bencheck, 360 Mich. 430, 104 N.W.2d 191 (1960); People v. Merhige, 212
Mich. 601, 180 N.W. 418 (1920).
63. See, e.g., People v. Barrows, supra note 62; People v. Morrison, 348 Mich. 88, 81
N.W.2d 667 (1957); People v. Banning, supra note 62.
64. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1058 (1954).
65. Mich. Pub. Acts 1875, no. 99.
66. Mioir. GEN. CT. R. 785.3(2). This rule was enacted in 1945.
67. Edwards v. People, 39 Mich. 760, 763 (1878).
68. People v. Barrows, 358 Mich. 267, 272, 99 N.W.2d 347, 350 (1959).
69. People v. Coates, 337 Mich. 56, 59 N.W.2d 83 (1953). The defendant appealed
his conviction on the ground, inter alia, that the court at no time questioned him as to
the facts of the alleged rape. Although there was an extensive interrogation of the ac-
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versals solely on the basis of failure to examine the circumstances of the
alleged offense.7 Though this issue has not been resolved, it is clear that if
an investigation is made and reveals the possibility of innocence, the court
must either inquire further and clear up the inconsistencies7' or refuse the
plea.7 s
The Advisory Committee which drafted new Rule 11 recommended a
Michigan-type procedure for the federal courts." They apparently felt
that the informality of the procedure was no obstacle to determining the
truth. This technique should be as accurate as the Virginia, Texas, and
Wisconsin procedures, if the trial judge carefully discusses the offense with
the defendant and the prosecutor, and less likely to crowd dockets. How-
ever, the Michigan approach lacks specific guidelines; it allows trial judges
great latitude in determining the scope of inquiry. Consequently, some
courts have sedulously investigated the facts of alleged crimes,7' while the
efforts of others have been, at best, cursory."
A recent New York case requires that if trial judges voluntarily explore
the facts of an alleged offense to any extent, all elements of the crime must
cused at the time of the plea, the accused was correct in stating that the facts of the rape
were never examined in the courtroom. The supreme court would not allow the plea
to be withdrawn, discussing the issues of the defendant's understanding and the volun-
tarines of his plea without ever fully answering the charge that the circumstances of the
rape were not exposed.
70. People v. Barrows, 358 Mich. 267, 99 N.W.2d 347 (1959), contains broad lan-
guage which unequivocally requires investigation of the factual basis of a guilty plea:
The direct questioning of a defendant by the trial judge on a plea of guilty is
required by the rule (785.3) for the purpose of establishing the crime and the
participation therein of the person pleading guilty. This is a precaution against
involuntary or induced false pleas of guilty and subsequent false claims of innocence.
Id. at 272, 99 N.W.2d at 350.
The court rule, which does not expressly call for a discussion with a defendant as to
the facts of the crime charged, was construed as requiring just that. However, when
the defendant entered his plea of guilty, the trial court accepted it without determining
whether he understood the nature of the charge and whether the plea was voluntary.
Hence, the actual grounds for reversal included failure to inquire into these factors as
well as failure in inquire into the details of the offense.
71. People v. Strick, 292 Mich. 173, 290 N.W. 369 (1940); People v. Hunn, 1
Mich. App. 580, 137 N.W.2d 275 (1965).
72. People v. Morrison, 348 Mich. 88, 81 N.W.2d 667 (1957); People v. Strick,
supra note 71; see People v. Bencheck, 360 Mich. 430, 104 N.W.2d 191 (1960); People
v. Ruckner, 254 Mich. 342, 236 N.W. 801 (1931); People v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601,
180 N.W. 418 (1920).
73. 34 F.R.D. 411, 417-18 (1964).
74. In re Valle, 364 Mich. 471, 110 N.W.2d 673 (1961); People v. Bumpus, 355
Mich. 374, 94 N.W.2d 854 (1959); People v. Funk, 321 Mich. 617, 33 N.W.2d 95
(1948).
75. People v. Wurtz, 1 Mich. App. 190, 135 N.W.2d 579 (1965); People v. Reed, 1
Mich. App. 60, 134 N.W.2d 374 (1965).
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be shown.7" This decision has been qualified by a more recent case which
held that a defendant need not be specifically interrogated as to any element
which can be clearly inferred from his testimony.7" Evidence adduced at
these inquiries cannot be used to increase the charge to a higher degree of
crime."
Though fewer trial courts appear to be making voluntary factual inquiries
in Minnesota than in Michigan or New York, reversals have occurred when
defendants' statements concerning their conduct were inconsistent with the
charges. 9 Courts in other states merely allow defendants pleading guilty to
explain the circumstances under which the crime was committed if they re-
quest to do so. s
Several states seem to require that certain questions be asked of defen-
dants before their guilty pleas may be accepted. Some courts ask defendants
if the allegations in the indictment are true;"1 another asks them if they are
pleading guilty because they are "in fact guilty."8" Though they were ap-
parently designed to insure the accuracy of pleas, these questions have be-
come perfunctory formalities.
B. Indirect Investigations
When a defendant pleads guilty, there is often a hearing or investigation
to determine the degree of crime committed or the extent or type of punish-
ment proper under the circumstances. A by-product of these proceedings
may be a finding that there is doubt as to the defendant's guilt.
76. People v. Serrano, 15 N.Y.2d 304, 206 N.E.2d 330, 258 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1955).
N.Y. CODE CRIm. PROC. §§ 308, 332 (1958) require only that an accused be informed of
his right to counsel before pleading guilty. It is interesting to note that New York is
one of several states with statutes providing that guilty pleas cannot be entered in capital
offenses. These statutes reflect a basic distrust of guilty pleas. E.g., N.J. Rnv. STAT. §
2A:113-3 (1951); N.Y. CODE COua. PROC. § 334 (1958); see LA. Rav. STAT. § 15-262
(1950).
77. People v. Rutigliano, 24 App. Div. 2d 875, 264 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1965). The
court held that under People v. Serrano, supra note 76, intent to burglarize was properly
inferred when the defendant sufficiently described his breaking, entering, and stealing of
certain property.
78. People v. Griffin, 7 N.Y.2d 511, 166 N.E.2d 684, 199 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1960);
People v. Ayiotis, 23 App. Div. 2d 760, 258 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1965).
79. State ex rel. Dehning v. Rigg, 251 Minn. 120, 86 N.W.2d 723 (1957). But see
State ex rel. Crosley v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 116 N.W.2d 666 (1962). In Crosley, the
fact that the defendant was fully informed of his right to trial and his persistence in
pleading guilty counterbalanced the inconsistency, and the conviction was affirmed.
80. Jurgenson v. State, 166 Neb. 111, 88 N.W.2d 129 (1958); State v. Leckis, 79 N.J.
Super. 479, 192 A.2d 161 (App. Div. 1963).
81. E.g., State ex rel. Crosley v. Tahash, 263 Minn. 299, 116 N.W.2d 666 (1962);
State v. Williams, 391 S.W.2d 227 (Mo. 1965).
82. People v. Kontopoulos, 26 Ill. 2d 388, 186 N.E.2d 312 (1962).
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1. Presentence Investigations
Most presentence investigations are conducted to aid the judge in de-
termining the proper punishment, including whether the accused should be
granted probation. Such proceedings are mandatory in many states"3 but
discretionary in others.8" Therefore, no such hearing occurs in many cases.85
In felony cases in Tennessee and capital cases in Texas, though the guilty
plea is treated as an admission of all the facts charged, a jury hears the evi-
dence in assessing punishment.8 ' Evidence raising doubt of the accused's
guilt has served as a basis for withdrawal of a guilty plea in the latter state,"
but no Tennessee cases allowing withdrawal could be found. In Minne-
sota, trial courts must reject guilty pleas when presentence investigations
turn up exculpatory or mitigating evidence. 8 Such evidence is also ground
for allowing the withdrawal of a plea in Arizona, 9 and has caused reversal
of a conviction in California.9
The use of presentence reports to determine the accuracy of guilty pleas
in Michigan has been studied in detail by Professor Newman." He ob-
serves that "a primary function of the pre-sentence investigation in these
... courts is to gather evidence that either supports or contradicts the plea of
83. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203; COLO. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 39-7-8 (Supp. 1963);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1-7(g) (Smith-Hurd
1964); Aas. R. Cam. P. 336.
84. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 909.12 (1961); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 1552(4)
(1964); Mn. CT. R. 761(c); Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.07(b).
85. See Note, 1964 WAsH. U.L.Q. 396, 399.
86. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2310 (1955); TEx. CODE Cim. PRoc. art. 502 (1948).
In capital cases in Texas, an accused may not waive a jury. Houston v. State, 162 Tex.
Crim. 551, 287 S.W.2d 643 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 975 (1956). If the defen-
dant pleads guilty before a jury, this plea constitutes an admission of all alleged facts,
and evidence brought in by the state is said to be for the purpose of fixing punishment.
Burks v. State, 145 Tex. Crim. 15, 165 S.W.2d 460 (1942); Howell v. State, 140 Tex.
Crim. 627, 146 S.W.2d 747 (1940) (dictum). See generally Johnson, Problems in Ac-
cepting Guilty Pleas and Pleas of Nolo Contendere, 26 Tax. B.J. 827 (1960).
87. Harris v. State, 76 Tex. Crim. 126, 172 S.W. 975 (1915); Richardson v. State,
164 Tea. Crim. 500, 300 S.W.2d 83 (1957) (dictum); Fite v. State, 163 Tex. Crim.
279, 290 S.W.2d 897 (1956) (dictum).
88. State v. Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 127 N.W.2d 153 (1964); State v. Jones, 234 Minn.
438, 48 N.W.2d 662 (1951). In another Minnesota case, evidence introduced at a pre-
sentence hearing was held sufficient to show guilt in fact. State v. Ware, 267 Mim. 191,
126 N.W.2d 429 (1964).
89. State v. Triplett, 96 Ariz. 199, 393 P.2d 666 (1964).
90. People v. Rosenberg, 212 Cal. App. 2d 773, 28 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1963). Califor-
nia courts, like New York courts, will not allow information gathered at such hearings
to be used to increase the charge. People v. Bravo, 237 Cal. App. 2d 459, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 921 (1965). See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
91. NEWMAN, CoNvicTio 14-18 (1966).
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guilty."92 In many cases the "approach is investigative rather than diag-
nostic," with half or more of the report focused on the facts of the offense."'
The report sometimes recommends a finding of guilt or innocence.' If the
evidence raises doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, the plea may be dis-
missed.95
Courts in some states have ignored inconsistencies between the offense
charged and the facts revealed in presentence hearings or reports. Illinois
cases call such evidence "irrelevant,"'9 and a South Carolina court rule
forbids any challenge of the facts in indictments through affidavits in miti-
gation of the offense. 7 Because of this difference in attitude in the various
states toward the trial judge's responsibility when factual issues are raised, it
is difficult to generalize about the extent to which courts employ pre-
sentence investigations to guard against false guilty pleas.
2. Degree-of-Crime Hearings
Because hearings to determine the degree of offense committed are needed
for only a few crimes, they occur far less often than presentence reports.
Such hearings are required in several states. 8 Obviously, the courts must
scrutinize the facts of the alleged crime, but the scope of this inquiry varies
greatly. Pennsylvania courts often hear the Commonwealth's entire case
in homicide prosecutions,99 while Florida requires only that witnesses be
called."0 In California, an accused's testimony as to what occurred has been
held sufficient. 1 ' Only Pennsylvania cases indicate that the court is under
a duty to reject guilty pleas when the evidence adduced raises doubt as to
the validity of the charge.0 2 Because only a few crimes have degrees, this
form of inquiry is of limited significance.




96. People v. Johnson, 28 Ill. 2d 531, 534, 193 N.E.2d 39, 40 (1963); accord, People
v. Wilfong, 19 Ill. 2d 406, 409, 168 N.E.2d 726, 728 (1960); see People v. Deweese, 27
Ill. 2d 332, 189 N.E.2d 247 (1963).
97. S.C. Cm. CT. R. 61.
98. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1192; FLA. STAT. § 909.11 (1961); IowA CODE §
690.4 (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-26-16 (1960); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-9
(1953).
99. See Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A.2d 338 (1963); Common-
wealth v. Kuklinskie, 34 Northumb. L.J. 63 (Northumberland County [Pa.] Ct. 1962);
Commonwealth v. Scarsellato, 36 Wash. Co. R. 127 (Washington County [Pa.] Ct. 1955).
100. FLA. STAT. § 909.11 (1961).
101. See People v. Bellon, 180 Cal. 706, 182 Pac. 420 (1919); People v. Gibbs, 188
Cal. App. 2d 596, 10 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1961).
102. Commonwealth v. Metz, 393 Pa. 628, 144 A.2d 740 (1958); Commonwealth v.
Kuklinskie, 34 Northumb. L.J. 63 (Northumberland County [Pa.] Ct. 1962).
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If indirect methods were used in all states, as are Michigan presentence
reports,'"3 to test the validity of guilty pleas, they could be an effective pro-
tection against false pleas. However, the small number of reversals of guilty
pleas on the basis of information elicited at presentence and degree-of-
crime hearings indicates that few states follow the Michigan example. These
indirect methods seem haphazard, at best, for insuring that false pleas of
guilt are discovered.
CONCLUSION
Arguably, the presence of an attorney representing the accused is sufficient
protection against false pleas. Though recent Supreme Court decisions
guarantee representation to all defendants in felony cases,' it is still possible
to waive the right to counsel and plead guilty. Even when an attorney is
present, however, he frequently does not probe the facts of the case in the
same manner as he would if he intended to go to trial.' In some instances,
the assistance given by counsel is quite minimal.' Therefore, the responsi-
bility for a factual inquiry must be assumed by the trial court.
The form and scope of inquiry needed to prevent false guilty pleas must
be a compromise between the need to insure accuracy in pleas and the de-
sire to keep administrative costs low. An informal inquiry, of the type prac-
ticed in Michigan,' strikes such a balance if conscientiously conducted by
trial judges. To insure that the inquiry will be more than a token ritual, the
trial judge should be required to interrogate the defendant as to the facts of
the charge. Merely asking an accused if he is guilty as charged is obviously
inadequate, but if the accused is asked to relate the events of the crime, it
will be difficult for him to fabricate a false account to support his plea. The
trial judge, by observing a defendant as he tells his story, can probably de-
termine credibility with reasonable accuracy from the spontaneity and de-
meanor of the accused. A defendant's candid forthright account of the
crime will ordinarily be sufficient to support the plea. In more complex
cases, when the defendant's account fails to substantiate all the necessary
elements of the crime, or when seeming inconsistencies are uncovered, some
additional evidence will be needed. In these instances, physical evidence
may be introduced and witnesses may be called. The rules of evidence need
not apply in this type of hearing, since its purpose is merely to corroborate
what the defendant already admits. The burden of proof could be either
103. Notes 91-95 supra and accompanying text.
104. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
105. NEWMAN, CONVICTION 201 (1966).
106. Id. at 200-05.
107. Notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, preponderance of the evidence, or probable
cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime. The former bur-
den does not seem excessive because the defendant is presumably willing
to relate his account of the crime-to make a judicially supervised confes-
sion. Since probable cause is the standard applied in preliminary hearings
and grand jury investigations, it would impose no burden that had not
been met earlier in the proceedings. If no specific burden is established, the
amount of evidence needed will be dependent upon the diligence of the
trial judge. Finally, of course, the avenues of appellate review would have
to be kept open to insure that these inquiries were conscientiously conducted.
The strength of such a system is that it keeps the focus where it should be
- on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. It overcomes the unsatis-
factory conclusion reached in many states that a guilty plea forecloses an
examination of the facts. To presume guilt is to fall far short of substantial
justice."' 8
108. From the time the indictment is presented or information filed to the entry
of the judgment of conviction, and throughout all forms of review of that judg-
ment, the primary matter to be determined is the guilt or innocence of the
accused. We err grievously when we allow ourselves to be diverted by other
inquiries. . . . United States v. Shelton, 246 F.2d 571, 580 (5th Cir. 1957)(dissenting opinion), rev'd per curiam, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
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